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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
NICHOLAS D. PHIPPS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case # 990941-CA 
Priority # 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE AND JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant was charged by Information with Contributing to 
the Delinquency of a Minor and Selling Tobacco to a Minor, a 
Class B and Class C Misdemeanor, respectively. Upon inquiry into 
having a public defender appointed to represent him, the court 
informed him that he did not qualify and, thereafter, Defendant 
waived his right to counsel and stood trial without the 
assistance of an attorney. Defendant was convicted on both 
counts and sentenced to six months, with all but six days stayed 
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $900. From that 
conviction, Defendant appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2A-3 (E) 
(1953), as amended. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
-1-
Issue 1. Did the trial court violate Defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel by denying him 
court-appointed counsel when he qualified? 
Standard of Review. The underlying empirical facts regarding 
a claim of indigency are reviewable for clear error; the 
conclusion as to whether those facts qualify the defendant as 
indigent is reviewable for correctness. State v. Vincent, 883 
P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1994). 
Issue 2. Did the trial court violate Defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury by failing to inform him of that right 
prior to trial? 
Standard of Review. Whether a trial Court violated 
Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury is a mixed question 
of law and fact and is reviewed with some deference to the trial 
court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about August 16, 1999, the Defendant was charged 
by Information with Contributing to the Delinquency of a 
Minor and Selling Tobacco to a Minor, a Class B and Class C 
Misdemeanor, respectively. (R0001-0002) On August: 26, 
1999, Defendant appeared in the Seventh District Juvenile 
Court before Honorable Judge S. Don LeBaron en these 
-?. 
charges. (R0011) He entered a plea of not guilty and the 
matter was set for trial on September 9, 1999. (R0011) On 
August 31, 1999, the Court granted a continuance of the 
trial until September 23, 1999. (R0013) 
On September 23, 1999, the trial was held in this 
matter and a colloquy took place between the Defendant and 
Judge LeBaron regarding his desire for self-representation. 
(Tr. at pp. 5-11) During said colloquy, the Defendant 
inquired as to whether the State would pay for an attorney 
for him. (Tr. at p. 10) Judge LeBaron inquired as to how 
much the Defendant made per month and was informed it was 
approximately $800 per month. (Tr. at p. 10) Judge LeBaron 
inquired as to the Defendant's hourly rate of pay and was 
informed it was $6.59 per hour. (Tr. at p. 10, 11) At the 
conclusion of these inquiries, Judge LeBaron informed the 
Defendant that he did not qualify for a public defender (Tr. 
at p. 11) and the Defendant stood trial without the 
assistance of an attorney. 
Defendant was found guilty of contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Selling 
Tobacco to a Minor, a Class C Misdemeanor, and was sentenced 
to serve 6 months in the Grand County Jail, with all but six 
days stayed, and pay fines in the amount of $900,00. 
(R0016-0018) On October 22, 1999, the Defendant filed a pro 
se Notice of Appeal regarding this decision. (R0027) 
On October 25 and 28, 1999, the Defendant filed 
Affidavits of Indigency with the Seventh District Juvenile 
Court requesting that a public defender be appointed to 
represent him. (R0021-0026, R0028-0032) On October 28, 
1999, based upon the information in the Affidavit of 
Indigency filed October 28, 1999, Judge LeBaron found that 
the Defendant was indigent and appointed current counsel to 
represent the Defendant for purposes of this appeal. 
(R0028-0032) On or about March 16, 2000, the Defendant 
applied for a Certificate of Probable Cause in this matter. 
(See Addendum ^B~) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of 
counsel was violated in that he was denied his right to court-
appointed counsel. The original position of the Utah Supreme 
Court on the issue of "indigency" was maintained under State 
v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 283 (Utah 1994) where it 
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determined that whether a defendant is indigent is a fact-
intensive inquiry requiring a consideration of the 
defendant's entire financial situation. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated that trial courts making an indigency 
determination should consider the defendant's " 'employment 
status and earning capacity; financial aid from family or 
friends; financial assistance from state and federal 
programs; [the defendant's] necessary living expenses and 
liabilities; [the defendant's] unencumbered assets, or any 
disposition thereof, and borrowing capacity. ' ff Id. at 283-4 
(citation & footnotes omitted) (alterations in original). 
After Vincent was decided, our legislature enacted the 
Indigent Defense Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-32-101 TO -704 
(1999). The [Indigent Defense] Act codifies and implements 
the procedural protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment. 
Orem City v. Bergstrom, 1999 WL 1079975 (Utah App. 1999) 
{attached as Addendum ~0) . 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-301(1) (1999) requires "...counsel 
for each indigent who faces the substantial probability of 
the deprivation of the indigent's liberty..." UTAH CODE ANN. 
§77-32-202 (3) (1999) defines and sets requirements on the 
-5-
trial courts for determining whether an individual is 
indigent and entitled to court-appointed counsel: 
(a) "Indigency" means that a person: 
(ii) has an income level at or below 150% 
of the United States poverty level as 
defined by the most recent revised 
poverty income guidelines published by 
the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services; 
(b) In making a determination of indigency, the 
[trial] court shall consider: 
(i) the probable expense and burden of 
defending the case; 
(ii) the ownership of, or any interest 
in, any tangible or intangible personal 
property or real property, or reasonable 
expectancy of any such interest; 
(iii) the amounts of debts owned by the 
defendant or that might reasonably be 
incurred by the defendant because of 
illness or other needs within the 
defendant's family; 
(iv) number, ages, and relationships of 
any dependants; and 
(v) other relevant factors. 
(emphasis added) 
After a simplistic inquiry into the Defendant's earnings, 
where the Court failed to follow the requirements of either UTAH 
CODE ANN. §77-32-202 (3) (A) OR (B)(1999), the Court misinformed 
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the Defendant that he did not qualify for court-appointed counsel 
and, based upon this misinformation, the Defendant waived his 
right to counsel and stood trial without the assistance of 
counsel. In a case similar to this one, this simplistic inquiry 
was deficient as a matter of law and violated Defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Orem City v. 
Bergstrom, 1999 WL 1079975 (Utah App. 1999). 
Additionally, the Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial was violated in that the Court failed to advise 
him of his need to make a written demand for a jury in a 
non-felony case. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(D) dictates the following 
with regard to this same issue: 
When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the 
case shall forthwith be set for trial. A 
defendant unable to make bail shall be given a 
preference for an early trial. In cases other 
than felonies the court shall advise the 
defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for 
making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(emphasis added) 
The Defendant was not informed at the arraignment or the 
trial held in this matter that if he desired to exercise his 
right to a jury trial that he must do so in the form of a written 
demand. The court violated the Defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial by failing to advise him of such. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED. 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI sets forth the following: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of counsel for his defence [sic]. 
A criminal defendant's right to counsel is guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799, 808 (Utah 1999). If an 
accused is indigent, he is entitled to court-appointed 
counsel. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917 (Utah 1998). 
"The right to have the assistance of counsel in a criminal 
trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be 
jealously protected by the trial Court." Id.,accord Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 
L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (stating "in our adversary system of 
criminal justice, any person haled into Court, who is too 
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless 
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counsel is provided him"). The Sixth Amendment embodies a 
realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average 
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to 
protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to 
take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is 
presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is 
simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer--to the 
untrained layman--may appear intricate, complex, and 
mysterious. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct.1019, 
1022, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). "The denial of the 
constitutional right to counsel requires reversal." In re 
W.B.J,. 966 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (emphasis 
added). 
The original position of the Utah Supreme Court on the 
issue of "indigency" was maintained under State v. Vincent, 
883 P.2d 278, 283 (Utah 1994) where it determined that 
whether a defendant is indigent is a fact-intensive inquiry 
requiring a consideration of the defendant's entire 
financial situation. The Utah Supreme Court has stated 
that trial courts making an indigency determination should 
consider the defendant's " 'employment status and earning 
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capacity; financial aid from family or friends; financial 
assistance from state and federal programs; [the 
defendant's] necessary living expenses and liabilities; [the 
defendant's] unencumbered assets, or any disposition 
thereof, and borrowing capacity.f " Id. at 283-4 (citation & 
footnotes omitted) (alterations in original) . 
After Vincent was decided, our legislature enacted the 
Indigent Defense Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-32-101 TO -704 
(1999). The [Indigent Defense] Act codifies and implements 
the procedural protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment. 
Orem City v. Bergstrom, 1999 WL 1079975 (Utah App. 1999) 
{attached as Addendum ~0) . 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-301(1) (1999) requires "...counsel 
for each indigent who faces the substantial probability of 
the deprivation of the indigent's liberty..." UTAH CODS ANN. 
§77-32-202 (3) (1999) defines and sets requirements on the 
trial courts for determining whether an individual is 
indigent and entitled to court-appointed counsel: 
(a) "Indigency" means that a person: 
(ii) has an income level at or below 150% 
-10-
of the United States poverty level as 
defined by the most recent revised 
poverty income guidelines published by 
the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services; 
(b) In making a determination of indigency, the 
[trial] court shall consider: 
(i) the probable expense and burden of 
defending the case; 
(ii) the ownership of, or any interest 
in, any tangible or intangible personal 
property or real property, or reasonable 
expectancy of any such interest; 
(iii) the amounts of debts owned by the 
defendant or that might reasonably be 
incurred by the defendant because of 
illness or other needs within the 
defendantf s family; 
(iv) number, ages, and relationships of 
any dependants; and 
(v) other relevant factors. 
(emphasis added) 
Orem City v. Bergstrom 1999 WL 1079975 (Utah App. 1999) 
{attached as Addendum ~C~), illustrates as follows the 
importance of following the requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§77-32-202 (1998) in determining whether a Defendant is 
indigent in order for a trial court to "jealously protect" 
an individual's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of 
counsel: 
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. . .Section 77-32-202 "squarely places on trial 
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional 
and [statutory] requirements are complied with." 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987) 
(guilty plea context). 
In this case, the trial Court considered none of 
the factors articulated in Vincent or in Section 
77-32-202 of the [Indigent Defense] Act. We 
therefore hold that the trial court's inquiry into 
Bergstrom's claim of indigence was deficient as a 
matter of law and violated his Sixth Amendment 
right to the assistance of counsel. Accordingly, 
we reverse and remand for a new trial. 
(emphasis added) 
In a Memorandum from the Administrative Office of the 
Courts, staff attorney Peggy Gentles details the most recent 
United States Department of Health and Human Services 
poverty guidelines which were issued February 24, 1998 (63 
Fed. Reg. 9235) (See Addendum ~D~). Under this guideline, 
one individual with no dependants is considered "indigent" 
if he or she makes $12,075 per year or $1,006 or less per 
month. 
In this case, the trial court failed to follow the 
requirements of Orem City v. Bergstrom, 1999 WL 1079975 
(Utah App. 1999) and UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202 (1998), in 
determining whether Defendant was indigent; and, based upon 
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that failure, misinformed Defendant that he did not qualify 
for court-appointed counsel. (Tr. at pp. 5-11) As shown 
under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202(3) (A) (II) (1998), the Defendant 
did qualify according to the information he provided to the 
trial court. 
In the midst of the court's colloquy with the Defendant 
regarding self-representation, the following dialogue took 
place regarding the issue of whether the Defendant was 
indigent and entitled to a court-appointed attorney: 
MR. PHIPPS 
THE COURT: 
MR. PHIPPS 
THE COURT: 
MR. PHIPPS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. PHIPPS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. PHIPPS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. PHIPPS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. PHIPPS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. PHIPPS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. PHIPPS: 
Can I ask a question? 
Yes. 
If I get an attorney, does the State 
pay for it, or do I? 
Well, it depends on if you qualify. 
Well, how much is to qualify? 
How much do you make a month? 
Maybe 800 to 1,000. 
Does it average 800 or 1,000, or 
900? 
It varies in between, depending on 
how many hours I get that month--
that week. 
How much did you make last year? 
I'm not really sure. My--I was out 
of state at the time. 
Do you work a 40-hour week? 
I do, and then I also work at Pasta 
Jay1s. 
Okay. Give me an average monthly 
salary, gross. 
I would say 800. 
Eight hundred a month? 
Uh-huh. Eight hundred a month—800 
-13-
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
PHIPPS: 
COURT: 
PHIPPS: 
COURT: 
PHIPPS: 
COURT: 
PHIPPS: 
COURT: 
a week (inaudible). 
Eight hundred a week? 
Yeah, I'm sorry, 800 a month, yeah. 
How much do you make an hour? 
Six fifty-nine an hour. 
And you work a 40-hour week? 
Uh-huh, or at least try. 
What was that again, hourly rate? 
Six fifty-nine an hour. 
You don't qualify for a public 
defender. . . 
(Tr. at pp. 10-11) 
The court should have recognized that Defendant 
qualified under UTAH CODE ANN, §77-32-202(3)(A) in that he 
reportedly makes less than 150% of the poverty guidelines 
set forth by the most recently revised poverty income 
guidelines published by the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services. (See Addendum ~D~). A Defendant 
claiming indigency who is charged with a crime the penalty 
of which is less than a class A misdemeanor is not required 
to comply with submitting a complete written affidavit of 
indigency. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202(2) (A) AND (B) . However, 
after having been denied court-appointed counsel previously 
upon his oral request, Defendant later submitted his request 
in writing twice. (R0021-0026, R0028-0032). 
In overlooking UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202(3)(A), the court 
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should have, at a minimum, followed the requirements of UTAH 
CODE ANN. §77-32-202(3) (B) and inquired of the Defendant or 
taken into consideration ". . .(i) the probable expense and 
burden of defending the case; (ii) the ownership of, or any 
interest in, any tangible or intangible personal property or 
real property, or reasonable expectancy of any such 
interest; (iii) the amounts of debts owned by the defendant 
or that might reasonably be incurred by the defendant 
because of illness or other needs within the defendant's 
family; (iv) number, ages, and relationships of any 
dependants; and (v) other relevant factors." The court did 
not probe the Defendant for any information regarding these 
factors in the colloquy. (Tr. at pp. 10-11) The court 
itself appears to have recognized this error one month 
following the trial on this matter when it found Defendant 
to be indigent and appointed counsel herein for purposes of 
this appeal. (R0028-0032) 
As with Orem City v. Bergstrom, 1999 WL 1079975 (Utah 
App. 1999), the trial court's inquiry into the Defendant's 
claim of indigence at trial here was deficient as a matter 
of law and violated his Sixth Amendment right to the 
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assistance of counsel in that the court failed to follow the 
requirements of either UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202(3) (A) or (B) 
in determining Defendant's indigency. As such, the matter 
should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
II. THE COURT VIOLATED DEPENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO A JURY 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure originally 
dictated in UTAH CODE ANN. §77-35-17(D) , as amended (1982 ed.) 
(repealed) set forth the entitlement of a jury trial for 
cases other than felonies: 
All other cases shall be tried without a jury 
unless the defendant makes written demand at least 
ten days prior to trial, or the Court orders 
otherwise. . . 
After said statute was repealed and replaced by the 
Rules, UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(D) dictated the following with 
regard to this same issue: 
When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the 
case shall forthwith be set for trial. A 
defendant unable to make bail shall be given a 
preference for an early trial. In cases other 
than felonies the court shall advise the 
defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for 
making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(emphasis added) 
On August 26, 1999, the Defendant appeared before Judge 
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LeBaron for an arraignment on Contributing to the 
Delinquency of Minors, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Selling 
Tobacco to a Minor, a Class C Misdemeanor. (R0011) The 
Minutes, Order and Decree from said hearing indicate that, 
"The parties were advised of their rights pursuant to Rule 
18 of the Juvenile Court Rules and Procedures." {See 
Addendum ~E~) The Defendant then entered a plea of not 
guilty and the matter was initially scheduled for trial for 
September 9, 1999. (R0011) 
UTAH R. JUV. P. 18 governs "Summons; service of process; 
notice". Rule 18 does not set forth anything with regard to 
the court's requirement under UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(D) to inform 
the Defendant of the " . . . requirements for making a 
written demand for a jury trial." According to the Minute 
entry, the court failed to inform the Defendant of his right 
to a jury at either the hearing held August 26, 1999, or 
prior to the trial held September 23, 1999. (R0011, R0016-
0018, Tr. at pp. 1-32). 
In State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam), the defendant was charged with a felony, but 
convicted of a misdemeanor and never made a waiver of a jury 
-17-
trial on the record; however, the prosecutor asked for and 
was granted a nonjury trial. The Utah Supreme Court stated 
that they will not presume a waiver of a jury trial from a 
"silent record." Id. They further stated that, "A criminal 
defendant's right to a jury trial is substantial and 
valuable and should be carefully safeguarded by our courts." 
Id. In this case, the Defendant never made a waiver of his 
right to a jury as he was never informed of said right by 
the trial court to have one. 
In State v. Garteiz, 688 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah 1984), 
Justice Durham explained in her concurrence, "There are 
presently no explicit procedural safeguards in our courts, 
no protective devices to assure that defendants understand 
what a jury's function is and that their right to a jury 
trial can in no way be abrogated without their full, 
informed consent." By failing to inform the Defendant of 
his right to a jury, this court did not allow Defendant the 
chance to give "full, informed consent" and therefore 
violated his Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial by 
proceeding to trial without having done so and without 
having obtained a waiver from Defendant of his right. 
-18-
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant/Appellant 
respectfully requests that this Court enter an order 
reversing the trial court's decision and remand the matter 
to the trial court for a new trial to be held in the matter 
DATED THIS 16rtl day of March, 2000. 
Happy J. Morgan 
Atxorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this the 16th day of March, 
2000, I caused to be served two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Appellant's Brief by first-class postage pre-
paid mail to the following: 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
J. Morgan 
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Addendum ~A~ 
$cp 2 7 1QQQ 
SEVENTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT SEV^ - - - - -
FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH JUVE^i. ; 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
NICHOLAS PHIPPS 
Defendant 
MINUTES, ORDER AND 
DECREE 
Case No.: 977430 
Tape: J99-34-Video Counter: 13:40 
Court is in Session: September 23, 1999 
Type & Charge: #001 -Contributing to the Delinquency of Minors 
#002-Selling Tobacco to a Minor 
Present: Nicholas Phipps; Lisa Carter, Probation Officer; Clark Messick, Bailiff; 
Claudia Page, Clerk: S. Don LeBaron, Judge. 
This matter came before the Court for trial on a petition filed herein alleging the above 
allegations. 
State calls Officer Eddie Guerrero who is sworn and examined. 
The parties were advised of their rights pursuant to Rule 18 of the Juvenile Court Rules 
and Procedures. Defendant waives his rights to an attorney. 
State calls Jordan Batwinas who is sworn and examined. Mr. Phipps cross examines the 
witness. 
State rests 
Nicholas Phipps calls Vinnie Phipps who is sworn and examined. State voir dires witness. 
Nicholas Phipps is sworn and gives testimony. Mr. Benge cross examines the witness. 
Redirect by Mr. Phipps. 
Defense rests. 
Mr. Benge gives closing. 
Mr. Phipps gives closing. 
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: 
The Court found the parties understood and knowingly and intelligently waived the above 
rights. Incidents #001 and #002 are found to be true, beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the 
evidence presented to the court. Further, that said defendant comes within the provisions of the 
Juvenile Court Act. 
Ms. Carter recommends fines and fees totaling $1,075.00 and 6 months in jail with all but 
5 days of the jail time suspended. 
NOWTHEREFORE AS DISPOSITION FOR INCIDENTS #001-CONTRIBUTING 
TO THE DELINQUENCY OF MINORS AND #002-SELLING TOBACCO TO A MINOR, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
That Nicholas pay a fine plus surcharge of $900.00 at the rate of SI 00 per month with the 
first payment due by October 23, 1999. Payments are to be made to the Seventh District Juvenile 
Court, 125 East Center, Moab, Utah, 84532. 
That Nicholas be committed to the Grand County Jail for 6 months with all but 6 days 
stayed. Defendant is to begin serving the 6 days on 3 consecutive weekends beginning September 
24, 1999, at 5:00 p.m. 
That Nicholas not make any direct nor indirect contact with Jordan Batwinas nor his family. 
Failure to comply with the order of this Court may result in your being found in contempt, 
loss of driver's license, forfeiture of income tax refund and could result in additional penalties and/or 
a commitment to jail. 
You have the right to appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. Appeals must be filed within 
30 days. 
Dated this 23rd day of September, 1999. 
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Copies mailed/hand delivered/faxed this ^{jf^ day of September, 1999, 
William L. Benge, County Attorney, 125 East Center, Moab, Utah. 
Nicholas Phipps, 748 Westwood, Moab, Utah, 84532 
B y _ C A o ^ A o ^ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
^L. 
Addendum ~B~ 
HAPPY J. MORGAN, Bar # ( 7586) 
GRAND COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Nicholas D. Phipps 
8 South 100 East 
Moab,Utah 84532 
Telephone: (435)259-9418 
Facsimile: (435) 259-3979 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
v. ] 
NICHOLAS D. PHIPPS, ; 
Defendant, ] 
) APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE 
) OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
) Case # 977430 
) JUDGE MANLY 
COMES NOW Nicholas D. Phipps, by and through counsel Happy J. Morgan, pursuant 
to Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann §77-20-10 (1995), and 
requests this Court issue a Certificate of Probable Cause and order the Defendant's sentence 
stayed pending the outcome of the appeal from his conviction subject to the least restrictive 
conditions reasonably necessary to meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §77-20-10 (1995). 
The Defendant requests that a ruling on his application be held within ten (10) days after 
this Court receives the State's reply, or if no reply is filed, within fifteen (15) days after the filing 
date of this application as required by Rule 27(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
The Defendant bases this Application for Certificate of Probable Cause on the grounds 
set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Law. 
DATED THIS 16th day of March, 2000. 
Attorney for Defendant 
liaDDV J. Morsan 
? 
HAPPY J. MORGAN, Bar # ( 7586) 
GRAND COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Nicholas D. Phipps 
8 South 100 East 
Moab,Utah 84532 
Telephone: (435)259-9418 
Facsimile: (435) 259-3979 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
v. ] 
NICHOLAS D. PHIPPS, ] 
Defendant, ; 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE 
) OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
) Case # 977430 
) JUDGE MANLY 
COMES NOW Nicholas D. Phipps by and through counsel Happy J. Morgan and submits 
this Memorandum in Support of Application for Certificate of Probable Cause. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On or about August 16, 1999, the Defendant was charged by Information with 
Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor and Selling Tobacco to a Minor, a Class B and Class 
C Misdemeanor, respectively. On August 26, 1999, Defendant appeared in the Seventh District 
Juvenile Court before Honorable Judge S. Don LeBaron on these charges. He entered a plea of 
not guilty and the matter was set for trial on September 9, 1999. On August 31, 1999, the Court 
granted a continuance of the trial until September 23, 1999. 
On September 23, 1999, the trial was held in this matter and a colloquy took place 
between the Defendant and Judge LeBaron regarding his desire for self-representation. During 
said colloquy, the Defendant inquired as to whether the State would pay for an attorney for him. 
Judge LeBaron inquired as to how much the Defendant made per month and was informed it was 
approximately $800 per month. Judge LeBaron inquired as to the Defendant's hourly rate of pay 
and was informed it was $6.59 per hour. At the conclusion of these inquiries, Judge LeBaron 
informed the Defendant that he did not qualify for a public defender and the Defendant stood 
trial without the assistance of an attorney. Defendant was found guilty of contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Selling Tobacco to a Minor, a Class C 
Misdemeanor, and was sentenced to serve 6 months in the Grand County Jail, with all but six 
days stayed, and pay fines in the amount of S900.00. On October 22, 1999, the Defendant filed a 
pro se Notice of Appeal regarding this decision. 
On October 25 and 28, 1999, the Defendant filed Affidavits of Indigency with the 
Seventh District Juvenile Court requesting that a public defender be appointed to represent him. 
On October 28, 1999, based upon the information in the Affidavit of Indigency filed October 28, 
1999, Judge LeBaron found that the Defendant was indigent and appointed current counsel to 
represent the Defendant. Said Appeal is currently pending in the Utah Court of Appeals (case# 
990941-C A). The Defendant has not previously applied for a Certificate of Probable Cause in 
this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
A CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE SHOULD 
BE ISSUED WHERE A NEW TRIAL IS LIKELY 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-20-10(1) states the following: 
The court shall order that a defendant who has been found guilty of an offense and 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in jail or prison, and who has filed an appeal 
or a petition for a writ of certiorari, be detained, unless the Court finds: 
(a) the appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in: 
(i) reversal; 
(ii) an order for a new trial; or 
(iii) a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment in jail 
or prison; 
(b) the appeal is not for the purpose of delay; and 
(c) by clear and convincing evidence presented by the defendant that he is not 
likely to flee the jurisdiction of the Court, and will not pose a danger to the 
physical, psychological, or financial and economic safety or well-being of any 
other person or the community if released. 
Defendant appeals to the Utah Court of Appeal on the issues of (1) whether his Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel was violated; and (2) whether his Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury was violated. Both issues presented are mixed questions of fact and 
law and are reviewed with some deference to the trial Court. State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 
1998); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
3 
THE COURT VIOLATED DEFENDANTS 
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant believes that he will prevail on the appeal in this matter and that a new trial is 
likely to occur. This notion is based upon the fact that the Court failed to follow the 
requirements of Orem City v. Bergstrom. 1999 WL 1079975 (Utah App. 1999) and UTAH CODE 
ANN. §77-32-202 (1998), in determining whether Defendant was indigent and, based upon that 
failure, misinformed Defendant that he did not qualify for Court-appointed counsel. Orem City 
v. Bergstrom. 1999 WL 1079975 (Utah App. 1999) illustrated the error of this Court in failing to 
follow the requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202 (1998) under the circumstances in this 
case: 
A criminal defendant's right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution (FN2) See State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799, 808 
(Utah 1999). "If an accused is indigent, he is entitled to court-appointed counsel." 
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917 (Utah 1998). "The right to have the assistance 
of counsel in a criminal trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be 
jealously protected by the trial Court." Id.; accord Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (stating "in our adversary 
system of criminal justice, any person haled into Court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided him"). The Sixth 
Amendment embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average 
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when 
brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the 
prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is 
simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer-to the untrained layman-may appear 
intricate, complex, and mysterious. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462063, 58 
S.Ct.1019, 1022, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 
. . ."The denial of the constitutional right to counsel requires reversal." In re 
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W.B.J., 966 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah Ct.App. 1998).. . 
. . ."Determining whether a defendant [is indigent] is a fact-intensive inquiry," 
requiring a consideration of the defendant's entire financial situation. State v. 
Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 283 (Utah 1994). Our supreme court has stated that 
courts making an indigency determination should consider the defendant's " 
'employment status and earning capacity; financial aid from family or friends; 
financial assistance from state and federal programs; [the defendant's] necessary 
living expenses and liabilities; [the defendant's] unencumbered assets, or any 
disposition thereof, and borrowing capacity.'" Id. at 283-4 (citation & footnotes 
omitted) (alterations in original). 
After Vincent was decided, our legislature enacted the Indigent Defense Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 77-32-101 to -704 fl999)(the Act). The Act codifies and 
implements the procedural protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment. See 
Utah Code Ann. §77-32-301(1) (1999) (requiring "counsel for each indigent who 
faces the substantial probability of the deprivation of the indigent's liberty"). 
The Act further details the necessary inquiry into a criminal defendant's claim of 
indigence. When a defendant has asked for court-appointed counsel, the [trial] 
court shall consider: 
(i) the probable expense and burden of defending the case; 
(ii) the ownership of, or any interest in, any tangible or intangible 
personal property or real property, or reasonable expectancy of any 
such interest; 
(iii) the amounts of debts owned by the defendant or that might 
reasonably be incurred by the defendant because of illness or other 
needs within the defendant's family; 
(iv) number, ages, and relationships of any dependants; and 
(v) other relevant factors. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-32-202(3)(b) (1999) (emphasis added). Section 77-32-202 
"squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and 
[statutory] requirements are complied with." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1312 (Utah 1987) (guilty plea context). 
In this case, the trial Court considered none of the factors articulated in Vincent or 
in Section 77-32-202 of the Act. We therefore hold that the trial court's inquiry 
into Bergstrom's claim of indigence was deficient as a matter of law and violated 
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his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we reverse 
and remand for a new trial. 
Additionally, though not enumerated in Orem City v. Bengstrom. Utah Code Ann. §77-
32-202(3)(b) states that, "'Indigency' means that a person: . . .has an income level at or below 
150% of the United States poverty level as defined by the most recent revised poverty income 
guidelines published by the United States Department of Health and Human Services; . . ." In a 
Memorandum from the Administrative Office of the Courts, Peggy Gentles details the most 
recent HHS poverty guidelines which were issued February 24, 1998 (63 Fed. Reg. 9235) (See 
Exhibit ~A~). Under this guideline, one individual with no dependants is considered "indigent" 
if he or she makes $12,075 per year or $1,006 or less per month. As shown in the proceeding 
paragraph, the Defendant did qualify according to the information he provided to Judge LeBaron. 
Proceeding the court's colloquy with the Defendant regarding self-representation, the 
following dialogue took place regarding the issue of whether the Defendant was indigent and 
entitled to a court-appointed attorney: 
MR. PHIPPS: Can I ask a question? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. PHIPPS: If I get an attorney, does the State pay for it, or do I? 
THE COURT: Well, it depends on if you qualify. 
MR. PHIPPS: Well, how much is to qualify? 
THE COURT: How much do you make a month? 
MR. PHIPPS: Maybe 800 to 1,000. 
THE COURT: Does it average 800 or 1,000, or 900? 
MR. PHIPPS: It varies in between, depending on how many hours I get that 
month—that week. 
THE COURT: How much did you make last year? 
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MR. PHIPPS: I'm not really sure. My-I was out of state at the time. 
THE COURT: Do you work a 40-hour week? 
MR. PHIPPS: I do, and then I also work at Pasta Jay's. 
THE COURT: Okay. Give me an average monthly salary, gross. 
MR. PHIPPS: I would say 800. 
THE COURT: Eight hundred a month? 
MR. PHIPPS: Uh-huh. Eight hundred a month-800 a week (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Eight hundred a week? 
MR. PHIPPS: Yeah, I'm sorry, 800 a month, yeah. 
THE COURT: How much do you make an hour? 
MR. PHIPPS: Six fifty-nine an hour. 
THE COURT: And you work a 40-hour week? 
MR. PHIPPS: Uh-huh, or at least try. 
THE COURT: What was that again, hourly rate? 
MR. PHIPPS: Six fifty-nine an hour. 
THE COURT: You don't qualify for a public defender. 
Besides the fact that the Defendant qualified under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202(3)(A) 
as argued previously, it is obvious by this dialogue that the Court failed to follow the 
requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-202(3)(B) in considering ".. .(i) the probable expense 
and burden of defending the case; (ii) the ownership of, or any interest in, any tangible or 
intangible personal property or real property, or reasonable expectancy of any such interest; (iii) 
the amounts of debts owned by the defendant or that mieht reasonablv be incurred bv the 
defendant because of illness or other needs within the defendant's family; (iv) number, ages, and 
relationships of any dependants; and (v) other relevant factors." The court must have recognized 
the consequences of its failure to abide by these requirements nearly one month following the 
trial on this matter when it found Defendant to be indigent and appointed counsel herein. 
Accordingly, the trial Court's inquiry into the Defendant's claim of indigence was deficient as a 
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matter of law and violated his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. 
THE COURT VIOLATED 
DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO A JURY 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(D) states the following: 
When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for 
trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early 
trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(emphasis added) 
On August 26, 1999, the Defendant appeared before Judge LeBaron for an arraignment 
on Contributing to the Delinquency of Minors, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Selling Tobacco to a 
Minor, a Class C Misdemeanor. The Minutes, Order and Decree from said hearing indicate that, 
"The parties were advised of their rights pursuant to Rule 18 of the Juvenile Court Rules and 
Procedures." (See Exhibit ~~B~) The Defendant then entered a plea of not guilty and the matter 
was initially scheduled for trial for September 9, 1999. UTAH R. Juv. P. 18 governs "Summons; 
service of process; notice". An analysis of Rule 18 does not set forth anything with regard to the 
court's requirement under UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(D) to inform the Defendant of the ".. 
.requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial." The Court failed to inform the 
Defendant of his right to a jury at either the hearing held August 26, 1999, or at the trial held 
September 23, 1999. 
In State v. Garteiz. 688 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah 1984), Justice Durham explained in her 
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concurrence, "There are presently no explicit procedural safeguards in our courts, no protective 
devices to assure that defendants understand what a jury's function is and that their right to a jury 
trial can in no way be abrogated without their full, infonned consent." By failing to inform the 
Defendant of his right to a jury, this court did not allow Defendant the chance to give "full, 
informed consent" and therefore violated his Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial by 
proceeding to trial without having done so. 
CONCLUSION 
THEREFORE, Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court 
enter an order granting this Application for Certificate of Probable Cause and order that 
Defendant's sentence be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal in this matter. 
DATED THIS 16th day of March, 2000. 
Happy 3. Morgan 
Attorney for Nicholas D. Phipps 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that, on this /^L day of t*fti2 . 2000,1 sent by first-class mail, postage-
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the above Application for Certificate of Probable Cause and 
Memorandum in Support to the following parties: 
Mr. William L. Benge 
125 East Center Street .— 
Moab,Utah 84532 / 
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D DIST JUVENILE COURT 
12 SOUTH 700 WEST 
^T LAKE CITY UT 84119 
gbmtntstrattbe <©it\tz of tfje Courts 
Chief Justice Michael D. Zimmerman 
Chair Utah Judicial Council 
To: District Court Judges 
Juvenile Court Judges 
Justice Court Judges 
Trial Court Executives 
Clerks of Court 
S u bj ect: P overty Guidelines 
MEMORANDUM 
From: 
Daniel J. Becker 
State Court Administrator 
Myron K. March 
Deputy Court Administrator 
Peggy Gentles, Staff A t t o m ^ X ^ 
Date: March 2, 1998 
Under Utah Code 8 77-32-202(3)(a), for purposes of appointment of counsel in criminal cases, the 
definition of indigency includes "has an income level at or betow 150% of the United States poverrv level 
as defined by thewmost recemlv revised poverrv income guidelines published by the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services." The most'recent HPiS povertv guidelines were issued 
Feoruary 24, 1998 (63 Fed. Reg. 9235). The following table contains 150% of the poverty guidelines for 
varvins family sizes. 
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NUMBER OF FAMILY MEMBERS 
1 
2 
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For every family member over eight add 
150% OF POVERTY GUIDELINE 
S12,075 
S16,275 
S20,475 
S24,675 
528,875 
S33,075 
S37,275 
541,475 
54,200 j 
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Holly Bullen, Assistant^ Court Administraror 
Brent Johnson, General Counsel 
D. Mark Jones, District Court Administrator 
Richard Schwermer, Assistant Coun Administrator 
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AUG 2 6 1999 
SEVENTH DISTRICT 
JUVENILE COURT 
SEVENTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
NICHOLAS PHIPPS 
Defendant 
MINUTES, ORDER AND 
DECREE 
Case No.: 977430 
Tape: J99-31-VIDEO Counter: 10:07 
Court is in Session: August 26, 1999 
Type & Charge: #001-Contributing to the Delinquency of Minors 
#002-Selling Tobacco to a Minor 
Present: Defendant Peggy Phipps, Mother; Lisa Carter, Probation Officer; Clark 
Messick, Bailiff; Claudia Page. Clerk; S. Don LeBaron, Judge. 
This matter came before the Court for arraignment on a petition filed herein alleging the 
above allegations. 
The parties were advised of their rights pursuant to Rule 18 of the Juvenile Court Rules 
and Procedures. 
Defendant denies the incident and same is set for trial on September 9, 1999, at 1:30 p.m. 
Dated this 26th day of August, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
Addendum ~C~ 
1999 WL 1079975, Orem City v. Bergstrom, (Utah App. 1999) Page 1 
*1079975 NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT 
BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL 
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 
OREM CITY, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Travis L. BERGSTROM, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 981690-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 2, 1999. 
Brett J, Delporto and Gregory G. Skordas, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
Robert J. Church, Orem, for Appellee 
Before Judges BILLINGS, DAVIS, and JACKSON. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
**1 If 1 Travis L. Bergstrom appeals the trial 
court's denial of his Motion for a New Trial and 
Motion for Arrest of Judgment. We reverse and 
remand for a new trial. 
BACKGROUND 
If 2 Bergstrom was charged with stalking, a class B 
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-106.5 (1999). At his arraignment, Bergstrom 
asked the trial court what he must do to secure a 
public defender. After asking about Bergstrom's age 
and employment, the trial court denied Bergstrom's 
request for court-appointed counsel. (FN1) 
U 3 Bergstrom then proceeded to prepare for trial 
pro se. He made a timely discovery request to Orem 
City (the City), dated April 24, 1998. However, the 
City did not respond to Bergstrom's discovery request 
until after the trial, which was held on June 8, 1998. 
Bergstrom represented himself at the bench trial, and 
presented two wimesses. He was convicted of 
stalking and sentenced to six months in jail, with all 
but fourteen days suspended. 
1f 4 Shortly after the trial, Bergstrom hired an 
attorney and moved for a new trial or for an arrest of 
the judgment. The trial court denied those motions, 
and Bergstrom now appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
f 5 " A district court has broad discretion in deciding 
whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial." 
Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 428 (Utah 1998). 
Bergstrom contends the trial court erred by 
determining that he was not indigent and denying him 
court-appointed counsel, and that this error warrants a 
new trial. "[T]he underlying empirical facts regarding 
[a] claim of indigency are reviewable for clear error; 
the conclusion as to whether those facts qualify the 
defendant as indigent is reviewable for correctness." 
State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1994). 
Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive of 
Bergstrom's appeal, we need not address his 
remaining arguments. 
ANALYSIS 
% 6 Bergstrom argues that the trial court failed to 
comply with the statutorily mandated procedure for 
determining whether a defendant is indigent, and this 
error requires reversal. The City counters that 
Bergstrom had the burden of proving his indigence, 
and that he failed to carry that burden. 
| 7 A criminal defendant's right to counsel is 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. (FN2) See State v. Bakalov, 979 
P.2d 799, 808 (Utah 1999). "If an accused is 
indigent, he is entitled to court-appointed counsel." 
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917 (Utah 1998). 
"The right to have the assistance of counsel in a 
criminal trial is a fundamental constitutional right 
which must be jealously protected by the trial court." 
Id.; accord Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (stating 
"in our adversary system of criminal justice, any 
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him"). The Sixth Amendment 
**2 embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious 
truth that the average defendant does not have the 
professional legal skill to protect himself when 
brought before a tribunal with power to take his life 
or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by 
experienced and learned counsel. That which is 
simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer-to the 
untrained layman-may appear intricate, complex 
and mysterious. 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 
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1019, 1022, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 
If 8 "However, the right to appointed counsel is not 
absolute.... When a defendant is charged with a 
misdemeanor crime, counsel is not necessarily 
guaranteed." Layton City v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655, 
658 (Utah Ct.App. 1997) (citation omitted), cert, 
denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997), and cert, denied, 
523 U.S. 1125, 118 S.Ct. 1811 (1998). Rather, the 
right to counsel for a defendant charged with a 
misdemeanor attaches only if the court determines, 
pretrial, to impose jail time. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 
U.S. 367, 369, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 1160, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 
(1979); Agersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40, 92 
S.Ct. 2006, 2014, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972). In this 
case, Bergstrom was sentenced to serve fourteen days 
of a six-month sentence. Thus, his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel was implicated. (FN3) "The denial of 
the constitutional right to counsel requires reversal." 
In re W.B.J., 966 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah Ct.App. 1998). 
Accordingly, we must determine whether the trial 
court properly denied Bergstrom's request for 
appointed counsel. If not, we must reverse. 
^ 9 The record shows that the court considered only 
two facts pertinent to Bergstrom's claim of indigence: 
his age and his employment status. This inquiry does 
not begin to meet the degree of scrutiny necessary to 
protect the fundamental right to the assistance of 
counsel. "Determining whether a defendant [is 
indigent] is a fact-intensive inquiry," requiring a 
consideration of the defendant's entire financial 
situation. State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 283 (Utah 
1994). Our supreme court has stated that courts 
making an indigency determination should consider 
the defendant's " 'employment status and earning 
capacity; financial aid from family or friends; 
financial assistance from state and federal programs; 
[the defendant's] necessary living expenses and 
liabilities; [the defendant's] unencumbered assets, or 
any disposition thereof, and borrowing capacity.' " 
Id. at 283-84 (citation & footnotes omitted) 
(alterations in original). 
1 10 After Vincent was decided, our legislature 
enacted the Indigent Defense Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
77-32-101 to -704 (1999) (the Act). The Act codifies 
and implements the procedural protections afforded by 
the Sixth Amendment. See Utah Code Ann. § 
77-32-301(1) (1999) (requiring "counsel for each 
indigent who faces the substantial probability of the 
deprivation of the indigent's liberty"). 
**3 T| 11 The Act further details the necessary 
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inquiry into a criminal defendant's claim of indigence. 
When a defendant has asked for court-appointed 
counsel, 
the [trial] court shall consider: 
(i) the probable expense and burden of defending 
the case; 
(ii) the ownership of, or any interest in, any 
tangible or intangible personal property or real 
property, or reasonable expectancy of any such 
interest; 
(iii) the amounts of debts owned by the defendant 
or that might reasonably be incurred by the 
defendant because of illness or other needs within 
the defendant's family; 
(iv) number, ages, and relationships of any 
dependents; and 
(v) other relevant factors. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-202(3)(b) (1999) (emphasis 
added). Section 77-32-202 "squarely places on trial 
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and 
[statutory] requirements are complied with." State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987) (guilty 
plea context). 
^ 12 In this case, the trial court considered none of 
the factors articulated in Vincent or in Section 
77-32-202 of the Act. We therefore hold that the trial 
court's inquiry into Bergstrom's claim of indigence 
was deficient as a matter of law and violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. 
K 13 Because this issue has not appeared before our 
courts, but is likely to in the future, "a statement of 
the law concerning [indigency determinations under 
section 77-32-202] in all trial courts in this state is 
appropriate." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312 (providing 
similar guidance regarding guilty pleas). When a 
criminal defendant who faces the threat of actual 
incarceration asks for court-appointed counsel, it is 
the court's duty to advise the defendant of the 
financial information it needs to properly evaluate the 
claim of indigence. 
U 14 Providing a defendant with a written form 
would ensure that the defendant clearly understands 
what information the court needs to evaluate a claim 
claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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of indigence. The affidavits of indigence currently in 
use, see, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-202(2)(a) 
(1999) (requiring defendants charged with\ class A 
misdemeanor or felony to file affidavit "containing] 
the factual information required in this section and by 
the court"), or some similar financial statement form 
would serve this purpose well. (FN4) Once the 
defendant has been advised what information he or 
she must provide, the burden then shifts to the 
defendant to supply this information. See Vincent, 
883P.2dat283. 
1f 15 "This procedure may take additional time, but 
constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in the name 
of judicial economy. The procedure outlined is 
designed to assist trial judges in making the 
constitutionally required determination" whether a 
defendant is truly indigent and deserving of court-
appointed counsel. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314. The 
fundamental right to counsel deserves all practical 
safeguards to protect it, and we feel it prudent to err 
on the side of caution. 
Other Issues Raised on Appeal 
**4. | 16 Because we hold that the trial court's error 
was harmful as a matter of law and warrants reversal, 
we need not determine whether the other claimed 
errors were harmful, or whether we should invoke the 
doctrine of cumulative error. See State v. Heat on, 
958 P.2d 911, 919 (Utah 1998) (declining to address 
other arguments raised on appeal because improper 
waiver of right to counsel "is dispositive"). 
CONCLUSION 
t 17 The trial court erred as a matter of law when it 
determined that Bergstrom was not indigent based 
solely on his age and employment status. This error 
affected Bergstrom's Sixth Amendment right to 
assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we reverse and 
remand for a new trial. 
H 18 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, 
Judge, JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge 
FN1. The actual exchange was as follows: 
BERGSTROM: How do I go about receiving [a] 
public defender? I can't afford an attorney. 
THE COURT: How old are you, Mr. Bergstrom? 
BERGSTROM: 30 years old, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. And do you have a job? 
BERGSTROM: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: And I'm going to deny your request 
for appointment of counsel. You're an adult male. 
You're 30 years old. You're old enough to make a 
living for yourself, and I assume you're old enough 
to retain an attorney. So if you will see the clerk, 
she'll give you a copy of that order. 
FN2. The Sixth Amendment provides, 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
FN3. It makes no difference in our analysis that a 
municipality-rather than the State or federal 
government-is the prosecuting entity. See City of 
St. George v. Smith, 828 P.2d 504, 506 (Utah 
Ct.App.1992). 
FN4. We note that a defendant such as Bergstrom, 
who was charged with a class B misdemeanor, need 
not actually file the affidavit with the court. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-202(2)(b) (1999). 
Nonetheless, establishing a uniform procedure that 
does not differentiate among defendants will make 
the trial court's job in this respect easier. Whether 
the defendant is required to formally file the 
affidavit or not, providing the affidavit or some 
similar form is a simple way for the court to gather 
the information required by our case law and 
statutes. 
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0 DIST JUVENILE COURT 
22 SOUTH 700 WEST 
•_,T LAKE CITY UT 84119 
gfcmtmstratibe Office of tije Courts 
Chief Justice Michael D. Zimmerman 
Chair Utah Judicial Council 
To: District Court Judees 
Juvenile Court Judges 
Justice Court Judges 
Trial Court Executives 
Clerks of Court 
Subject: Poverty Guidelines 
MEMORANDUM 
From: 
Daniel J. Becker 
State Court Administrator 
Myron KL March 
Deputy Court Administrator 
Peggy Gentles, Staff Attorn^jS^ 
Date: March 2, 1998 
Under Utah Code 8 77-32-202(3)(a), for purposes of appointment of counsel in criminal cases, the 
definition of indigency includes "has an income level at or below 150% of the United States poverty level 
as defined by the~most recently revised poverrv income guidelines published by the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services." The most recent HHS poverty guidelines were issued 
February 24, 1998 (63 Fed. Reg. 9235). The following table contains 150% of the poverty guidelines for 
varying family sizes. 
NUMBER OF FAMILY MEMBERS 
1 
2 
3 
1 4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
For every family member over eight add 
\G.ec\\^ UobcV^Vu 
\ 1 
150% OF POVERTY GUIDELINE 
$12,075 
516,275 
520,475 
$24,675 
$28,875 
$33,075 
$37,275 | 
$41,475 J 
$4,200 j 
\,ooQ 
\,d>^C 
\, 7&£ ! 
i^°^ 
•x i^Q 
3y i O 4 
3 / 4 ^ 
Holly Bullen, Assistant Court Administrator 
Brent Johnson, General Counsel 
D. Mark Jones, District Coun Administrator 
Richard Schwermer, Assistant Coun Administrator 
230 South 500 Easi / Suite 300 / Salt Lake Citv, \Ji2h S4102 / (801 ^ vra-^nn , c. 
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AUG 2 6 1999 
SEVENTH DISTRICT 
JUVENILE COURT 
SEVENTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
NICHOLAS PHIPPS 
Defendant 
MINUTES, ORDER AND 
DECREE 
Case No.: 977430 
Tape: J99-31-VIDEO Counter: 10:07 
Court is in Session: August 26, 1999 
Type & Charge: #001-Contributing to the Delinquency of Minors 
#002-Selling Tobacco to a Minor 
Present: Defendant Peggy Phipps, Mother; Lisa Carter, Probation Officer; Clark 
Messick, Bailiff; Claudia Page, Clerk; S. Don LeBaron, Judge. 
This matter came before the Court for arraignment on a petition filed herein alleging the 
above allegations. 
The parties were advised of their rights pursuant to Rule 18 of the Juvenile Court Rules 
and Procedures. 
Defendant denies the incident and same is set for trial on September 9,1999, at 1:30 p.m. 
Dated this 26th day of August, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
